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THE TRINITY AND EXTENDED SIMPLES 
Martin Pickup 
 
In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended simples 
that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools developed 
to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary 
analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual distinctions 
in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, 
the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some 
who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent. 
 
In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended simples. In doing so, I 
hope to shed some light on the philosophical problems of Trinitarian doctrine and suggest a 
tentative way to address the core of them. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and 
debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, 
can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be 
for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity 
might surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other 
incoherent. 
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In order to show connections between these seemingly disparate topics, I shall first 
briefly introduce the notion of extended simples before, in the next section, outlining the 
core contemporary philosophical problem of the Trinity. In the later parts of the paper, I’ll 
then apply the conceptual resources provided by extended simples to the specified 
Trinitarian problem. 
Extended simples, as might be expected, are entities that are both extended and 
simple. They are extended in the sense of occupying regions of space and they are simple in 
the sense of having no parts. So, to speak more colloquially, extended simples are objects 
which are spread out in space but which do not have any bits to them.1 
Extended simples would be strange, and there is a discussion in the metaphysics 
literature about whether or not they are possible. For how can something that is extended 
not be made up of parts? Even proponents of the possibility of extended simples will admit 
that this is strange. The strangeness comes from the fact that the parthood relations are 
different for the entity and its location: the simple entity has no parts but the region the 
extended object occupies does have parts.2 Thus, the mereological structure of extended 
simples comes apart from the mereological structure of the spatial regions they occupy. I 
submit that this is the source of (at least some of) the strangeness of extended simples; a 
dissonance introduced by the structural difference between entities and their locations. 
Defenders of the possibility of extended simples point out that just because this is 
strange doesn’t make it impossible, and that there is no obvious contradiction in the notion 
of something occupying complex spatial regions but having no parts. In other words, these 
metaphysicians claim that for at least some possible objects, their mereological structure 
and the structure of their location are not aligned.3 The possibility of extended simples 
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would therefore demonstrate that the mereological structures of these two are at least 
logically independent. It is this distinction, between the structures of entities and of their 
locations, that I want to exploit in presenting an analogy between extended simples and the 
doctrine of the Trinity. But before discussing the analogy, we should set out clearly the 
problem to address. 
 
(i) The Problem of the Trinity 
The doctrine of the Trinity is a claim about what God is. It is a claim that God is, in some 
sense, three, and, in some sense, one. It is a doctrine with a long and intricate history. The 
scriptural evidence, the early church discussions, and later debates have all contributed to 
the doctrine. It is contentious how, precisely, we should understand it. Nevertheless, in 
contemporary philosophical discussion of the doctrine, we can identify a core question: how 
can God be both three and one?  
 Any account of the Trinity faces this difficulty. To give an example of a text that gives 
rise to these worries, consider part of the Athanasian Creed: 
[W]e worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity; Neither confounding the 
Persons: nor dividing the Substance. For there is one Person of the Father, 
another of the Son: and another of the Holy Ghost … So the Father is God, the 
Son is God: and the Holy Ghost is God.4 
A prima facie reading of Athanasian text would propose that each of the Father, Son and 
Spirit are God, but that they are distinct. It is this contention that is the typical starting point 
for the contemporary philosophical discussion.5 Of course, there is a good doctrinal 
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question about whether this is the right way to understand the various creedal claims, but 
this is not one I’ll consider here. Rather, I want to see whether extended simples can help 
with what we might call the ‘philosophers’’ problem of the Trinity. 
 So, what is this problem? Well, a straightforward way of understanding that the 
Father, Son and Spirit are God but that they are distinct is that: 
(1) The Father is God 
(2) The Son is God 
(3) The Holy Spirit is God 
And also that: 
(4) The Father is not the Son 
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit 
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit 
The problem is that, if we read the ‘is’ in each case as an ‘is’ of identity, we have the 
resulting claims (where F, S, H and G abbreviate their obvious candidates): 
(7) F = G 
(8) S = G 
(9) H = G 
(10)  F ≠ S 
(11)  F ≠ H 
(12)  S ≠ H 
 But by the transitivity and symmetry of identity,  
(13)  F = S 
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(14)  F = H 
(15)  S = H 
Any of these three provides a contradiction with one of (10) – (12). This is the core 
contemporary philosophical problem.6 
One solution to this problem is to toy with identity so that a contradiction cannot be 
derived from (7) – (12). An obvious way of doing so is to deny either the transitivity or the 
symmetry of identity. But this is massively controversial: any relation that is not both 
transitive and symmetric doesn’t seem to be identity. Another suggestion along these lines 
is the relative identity view, according to which we should understand identity as (in at least 
some cases) being with respect to a particular sortal.7 According to such a view, (7) – (12) 
are incomplete because they do not specify the sortal under which the terms fall. A relative 
identity theorist might therefore hope that holding the sortal terms fixed avoids a 
contradiction. I don’t favour a relative identity view: any sort of adjustments to or 
complications of identity are liable to serious objection. But I will not here try to 
substantiate such objections. Instead, for reasons of space, I’ll simply set this alternative 
aside. 
If we accept the canonical account of identity, then, (7) – (12) does indeed lead to 
contradiction. We must therefore find a reason to deny that all of (7) – (12) are the 
appropriate translations of (1) – (6). But then the task is to say which are inappropriate and 
why, whilst maintaining a view that can faithfully be called Trinitarian. 
There are two broad approaches to this. The first takes (7) – (9) to be inappropriate 
translations of (1) – (3) and the second takes (10) – (12) to be inappropriate translations of 
(4) – (6). The first approach emphasises the distinctness of the Persons, the second 
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approach emphasises the unity of God. These two different ways of proceeding are 
sometimes called the Greek and Latin approaches to the Trinity, respectively (though the 
historical aptness of these designations is not certain8). This paper will take the second way, 
that of trying to account for the distinctness of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit without 
translating this into the definitive denial of numerical identity. The reason I do so is simply 
that I find the criticisms of the Greek approach convincing.9 But I do not have space to argue 
this here. Thus, I will be exploring a Latin Trinitarian view, as advocated in this journal and 
elsewhere by Brian Leftow.10 The paper can therefore be seen as a way of spelling out the 
Latin approach, and suggesting reasons to think it plausible. The comparative task of 
assessing the costs and benefits of the Latin approach versus the alternatives will have to 
wait for another day.  
As I am taking a Latin view, I will be examining the translatability of (4) – (6) into (10) 
–  (12). I will deny that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are numerically distinct entities. But 
this seems to spell trouble: the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are supposed to be persons, and 
different persons. How can this be compatible with them not being numerically distinct 
entities? We need to find a way to model the fact that they are numerical identical as God, 
but still hold onto some version of the assertion that they are distinct persons. It is here that 
I believe the analogy with extended simples can help us. 
 
(ii) The Analogy between Extended Simples and the Trinity 
Recall that in the case of extended simples, the structure of space and the structure of the 
entity come apart. With this in mind, my core claim can now be stated rather briefly: in the 
divine the ‘substance-structure’ described by the statements of identity above, (1) – (3), 
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comes apart from the ‘person-structure’ of the statements of the distinctions between the 
Persons of the Trinity, (4) – (6). These scare quotes indicate that there is further explaining 
to do. But we can immediately note that the relationships between the Father, Son and 
Spirit are to be analogous to the relationships between the spatial regions that an extended 
simple occupies, while the relationships between each of Father, Son and Spirit and God are 
to be analogous to the relationships between the entities located at the regions an 
extended simple occupies, viz. identity. The ‘person-structure’ and the ‘substance-structure’ 
of the divine are not isomorphic, in much the same way that the location structure and 
mereological structure of extended simples are not isomorphic.11 
Of course, this claim needs to be spelt out in much more detail. The ‘substance-
structure’ I am appealing to should be easily comprehensible: it is standard identity. There 
are numerous questions about identity but these are not peculiar to the Trinity: the identity 
of the Father, Son and Spirit with God should be understandable. The real work to do in 
explaining this analogy is to make clear what is meant by the ‘person-structure’ of the 
Father, Son and Spirit. In the analogy, this corresponds to the complex location of the 
extended simple or, in other words, the spatial regions occupied by the simple entity. 
What we need, then, is a notion of ‘person-space’ and of the occupancy of this space 
by entities. I will be thinking of the Persons of the Trinity on a model of actual and possible 
persons: though arguably theologically naïve, if we can make sense of the Trinity using these 
naïve tools then there is at least one way to make sense of the doctrine. Furthermore, there 
is no obvious reason why any sophisticated theological use of ‘Person’ would make issues 
for what is to come.  
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Although our primitive notion of a ‘space’ is derived from the space that material 
objects occupy, we can formalise a number of other spaces for other purposes. For instance, 
in physics the configuration space of a system describes all the possible states in which the 
system can be. In other words, it is the range of all the possible configurations of the 
system. A point in the space corresponds to a particular configuration of the entire system. 
Configuration space is a space with more dimensions that the three of physical space, and 
can have certain mathematical and geometrical properties (including distance relations). A 
more philosophical example is the space of possibility per se.12 Using Lewisian modal realism 
as an explanatory short cut, we can generate a space of possibility by taking each point of 
the space to correspond to a way for the world to be (i.e. a possible world). The space of 
possibility describes how actuality might be. For Lewis, distance relations can be defined on 
this space according to relative similarity between worlds.  
Importantly, we can choose to introduce spaces as we find them useful. As an 
example, I propose a new notion: taste-space. I can stipulate that this is the space that 
describes all possible tastes. A point in taste-space corresponds to a way for something to 
taste. Tastes that are more similar will be closer to each other in this space. It is reasonable 
to think that overall tastes involve the relative amount and balance of more primitive tastes 
like saltiness, sweetness, acidity, spiciness etc. These more primitive tastes can therefore 
provide the axes of this space, allowing distance relations to be defined on the space. The 
example of taste-space shows that we can describe certain features of the world or of our 
experiences using spatial analogues, with associated benefits of formalisation. 
The notion of space, then, seems sufficiently flexible to permit us to introduce 
spaces if they will be useful. I want to introduce a particular space I’ll call person-space: the 
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space of possible persons. This space is made up of points, and occupying a certain point in 
person-space is being a certain possible person. Distances between points in person-space 
report how alike persons are: these distance relations can be brute or depend on certain 
more primitive axes of similarity. Thus, two entities that are similar people will occupy 
nearer points of person-space than two entities that are very different people. 
But what is person-space? To begin to answer this, I will first give some examples to 
get a grip on how the concept is supposed to work. So, consider some entities and their 
occupation of person-space: I occupy exactly one point in person-space; Hillary Clinton 
occupies exactly one point in person-space; I do not have a sister, but if I did my sister would 
occupy exactly one point in person-space (cashing out this ‘would’ will connect to questions 
about the existential status of merely possible entities); the milk in the fridge occupies no 
location in person-space as it is not a person. 
These are the easy examples, where the points of person-space have at most one 
occupant and the entities occupy at most one point of person-space. But there are also 
interesting examples where this seems not to be the case. I’ll spend a little while discussing 
these.  
First, imagine a football team on a pitch. Grant that we can consider the team as a 
whole, i.e. as a single thing.13 There is a natural metaphysical carving of this whole into 11 
parts, namely into the 11 players. The team has the mereological structure of having 11 
parts. Each of these parts occupies a single point in person-space, as each of the players is a 
person. These points are different, of course. I suggest we think of the whole team, which is 
composed of these 11 players, as having a location in person-space too. In particular, I 
propose it is extended in person-space by occupying the 11 points of person-space that are 
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the locations its parts.14 The team is spread out in person-space across all and only the 
points that its parts occupy. The football team is therefore an example of something 
occupying multiple points of person-space. In such a case, the mereology and person-
structure of the team are aligned: there is a one-to-one correspondence between the points 
of person-space the team occupies and its parts. 
The concept of person-space allows us to describe some more contentious examples 
too. In the story of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, it seems that there are two people in one body. 
This can be captured using person-space: in the story there is one entity occupying two 
distinct points of person-space (using the term ‘entity’ here deliberately avoids the difficult 
issue of what exactly is the thing that is two persons). I also want to note, tentatively, that 
this might be an accurate description of some individuals diagnosed with Dissassociative 
Identity Disorders (previously called Multiple Personality Disorders). Perhaps in such 
circumstances there is a single entity occupying distinct points of person-space. I do not 
wish to take a stand on these real life cases, though they are suggestive.  
The last couple of paragraphs have pointed to cases where it seems that things 
occupy more than one point of person-space. Another interesting issue is whether two 
entities can occupy exactly the same point in person-space. This is the question of whether 
two distinct things could both be a certain person. Esoteric cases involving clones or time-
travellers might be examples of this. Suppose, for instance, that Alice time-travels to a point 
in her past. Perhaps the right way to understand this is that at that time there are two 
distinct things (young Alice and old Alice) which are the same person. Of course, what to say 
in such situations is controversial and depends on one’s views of the persistence of objects 
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and persons through time. But points of person-space being multiply occupied is one 
alternative. 
A different case where we might want multiple occupation of points of person-space 
is qualitative identity. Suppose two entities are qualitatively indistinguishable regarding all 
properties that relate to personhood. Does this entail that they occupy the same point of 
person-space? This is the question whether two entities that are exactly similar in this 
respect are in fact the same person.15 No particular answer to the question is needed for the 
notion of person-space I will use. But discussing these questions through the lens of person-
space highlights them and helps us to see how person-space works.  
Finally, let me flag another interesting question. Can entities move through person-
space? We can imagine such a possibility in the following way: suppose that an entity 
changes which person it is across time (for simplicity, in a smooth and continuous way 
across a fixed axis in person-space). In such a case, it seems that the entity would trace a 
line in person-space. Of course, this requires that it is not essential to an entity that it is a 
particular person. Note, though, that if we add a temporal axis into person-space so that the 
points correspond to being a certain person at a certain time, every entity that is a person 
for more than an instant will occupy multiple points of person-space. 
The discussion of the above strange cases is helpful to get a sense of the flexibility of 
the notion of person-space. There are decisions to make about it. Some of these decisions 
will depend on what we think is possible for persons and for entities. I’ve deliberately 
avoided taking a view on this. The use of person-space, however, allows us to tease apart 
the relevant questions. 
12 
 
Another decision, though, is one about which I will specify a preference. This 
concerns the ontological status of person-space. The central issue is whether person-space 
is anything over and above the occupants thereof and their properties and relations. In 
other words, should we be substantivalist or anti-substantivalist about person-space? 
Compare this with substantivalist and anti-substantivalist views of space itself: the former 
hold that space and its points are in the fundamental ontology of reality while the latter 
suggest that their existence is merely derivative. There are similar issues concerning the 
ontological status of configuration space and modal space. In each of these three cases, 
there is ongoing and well-documented disagreement.16 Above, I introduced the notion of 
taste-space. It seems much less contentious what the ontological status of taste-space is: it 
is naturally thought of as no more than the possible tastes and their relationships. We 
should be anti-substantivalist about taste-space.  
I also prefer an anti-substantivalist view of person-space. I take it that person-space 
is nothing over and above the entities occupying it and their properties and relations. I 
prefer this view because do not wish my use of person-space to add to my fundamental 
ontology. I will therefore be using an anti-substantivalist account of person-space in what 
follows. It is open to others, however, to develop my account of the Trinity in line with a 
substantivalist account of person-space.  
Given an anti-substantivalist approach to person-space, some more metaphysics can 
be given for person-space. I take person-space to be an abstraction of the facts about 
possible personhood. It is thus a formalisation of certain group of modal facts.17 I therefore 
take it to be merely a way of presenting some pre-existing claims: it does not add anything 
metaphysically speaking.18 Though it may serve as a clarification and rigidification of 
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personhood facts, it does not add to the ontological ingredients of the world. Person-space 
as a whole, which considers all possible persons, covers all of the range of possibilities for 
personhood and is thus exhaustive. Points of this space are thus to be thought of as specific 
possibilities for personhood. In particular, a point of person-space is a representation of a 
group of properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for being a certain possible 
person. So a particular point corresponds to a particular possible person and distinct points 
of the space represent distinct possible persons. I wish to be deflationary, too, about points 
of person-space. They are not additions to the ontology but structures to describe and 
formalise certain pre-existing specific claims about personhood. Both for person-space in 
general and for points of person-space in particular, therefore, I do not wish to be 
committed to anything beyond a formalisation of our independently motivated theories 
what it is to be a person and to be a specific person.19 
The final issue to address in this section is how persons and person-space are 
related. I have said above that the occupation of a point of person-space by something is 
that thing being the corresponding person. It is things that are people: the points of person-
space correspond to the ways that things can be people. Person-space is thus a description 
of the range of possibilities for things in the domain of personhood. We might say that 
person-space is the personal possibilities for things quite generally.20 A person, therefore, is 
something occupying a point of person-space. When something occupies a point of person-
space, it is the relevant person. Person-space is the abstract representation of what it is to 
be all actual and possible persons. 
This concludes the introduction to person-space. It is a space produced from the 
facts about possible personhood and describes the ways things could be persons. Points in 
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person-space are occupied by things, and this occupation amounts to that thing being that 
person. Typically, we consider things that occupy just one point of person-space, but we 
have also considered putative cases where the occupation of points of person-space by 
entities is more complicated. For instance, the football team and Jekyll/Hyde cases might 
suggest that things can occupy multiple points of person-space, while the time-travel case 
might suggest that points of person-space can be occupied by multiple entities. In what 
follows, I will use the notion of person-space and, specifically, its multiple occupation to 
draw the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity. In doing so I attempt to solve 
the problems the latter faces. 
 
(iii) The Solution to the Problem 
I claim that the divine occupies multiple locations of person-space. More precisely, I claim 
that the single and simple entity that is God is located at three distinct points of person-
space. Unlike the case of the football team above, God does not occupy three distinct points 
of person-space by having as parts three distinct entities occupying those points. Rather, 
one and the same God has a location in person-space three times over. God is a simple 
extended in person-space. Some notation will be helpful here. I’ll translate ‘entity a is 
person P’ as ‘a occupies point p of personal space’. For every P, there is a corresponding p. 
Thus, I claim that God occupies three points of person-space, which we can call f, s, and h. 
By being at f, God is the Father. By being at s, God is the Son. By being at h, God is the Holy 
Spirit. The same entity occupies these three points of person-space, so there is only one 
divine entity. But the distinct points of person-space correspond to distinct persons, so 
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there are three divine persons.  This allows us to say that there is only one God, but three 
persons. 
This is the central idea. But we now need to show exactly how it solves the problem 
outlined above when introducing the doctrine of the Trinity. What would this mean for the 
statements (1) – (12)? Let us consider them in turn.  
(1) The Father is God 
(2) The Son is God 
(3) The Holy Spirit is God 
(1) – (3) refer to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit and say of them that they are God. Using the 
notion of personal space introduced above, I gloss these as follows: 
 (1’) The occupant of f is God 
 (2’) The occupant of s is God 
 (3’) The occupant of h is God 
In other words, the terms ‘the Father’, ‘the Son’ and ‘the Holy Spirit’ in (1) – (3) I take to 
refer to the entity occupying the relevant points of personal space. Thus, following the 
extended simple analogy, we can say that they refer to one and the same entity, namely 
God. This means that their translation into the identity statements below is appropriate: 
(7) F = G 
(8) S = G 
(9) H = G 
F, S, H and G here all denote entities (in fact, they all denote one and the same entity). So 
we can retain (7) – (9) on the interpretation I am offering. 
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What about the second set of statements derived from the doctrine? These are 
below: 
(4) The Father is not the Son 
(5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit 
(6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit 
Now, we know that the entities involved in these statements are all the single divine entity. 
Hence we should not interpret these as the denial of the identity claims about entities. In 
other words, we do not want to accept the translation of (4) – (6) into the following claims 
of numerical distinctness: 
(10)  F ≠ S 
(11)  F ≠ H 
(12)  S ≠ H 
But we do want to maintain that the persons of the Trinity are distinct as persons. What this 
means is that there are three points of person-space, not one, occupied by the divine entity. 
Thus, (4) – (6) should be interpreted as claims about the structure of the person-space 
occupied by God, not as claims about the structure of the identity relations that hold within 
the Godhead. (4) – (6) should be glossed as: 
 (4’) f is not s 
 (5’) f is not h 
 (6’) s is not h 
Of course, all of these are true: these are indeed distinct points in person-space. But (4’) – 
(6’), which refer to points of person-space, clearly do not entail (10) – (12), which refer to 
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entities. We are not therefore required to hold (10) – (12), which generate a contradiction 
via the transitivity and reflexivity of identity. Rather, we can say of the points of person-
space: 
 (10’) f ≠ s 
 (11’) f ≠ h 
 (12’) s ≠ h 
But, of course, these do not create a contradiction with (7) – (9). This is how the analogy 
between extended simples and the Trinity is supposed to shed light on the latter: by 
distinguishing between the structures of person-space and entities we can give grounds for 
the claim that (10) – (12) are not the appropriate translations of (4) – (6) and offer 
alternatives. 
 The contention of the analogy, therefore, is this: being a certain entity and being a 
certain person are not the same thing, even if that entity is that person. These are 
conceptually distinct, and so being a certain entity and being a certain person are 
distinguishable. Even if typically entities and persons are matched one-to-one, it is 
conceptually possible that they are not. This conceptual possibility is actual in the case of 
the divine: the Persons of the Trinity are the very same entity but there really are three 
Persons. The analogy with extended simples shows how such structures can be 
distinguished, and the mechanisms by which to express the conceptual possibilities 
involved. God occupies three distinct points of person-space but is a single entity. I thus 
argue that the Latin Trinitarian approach can maintain the appropriate sense of the 
distinctness of the Persons.    
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(iv) Responses to Worries 
There are a number of worries that might arise from the preceding argument. Here I want 
to anticipate some of them. 
Modalism 
The first concern is the ever-present one for Trinitarian thought that emphasises the unity of 
the Godhead: modalism.  Modalism is a view that is explicitly ruled out by the doctrinal 
constraints, so my picture cannot be a form of modalism on pain of radical revisionism. I will 
take modalism to be the claim that God’s three-ness is not fundamental. Or, to put it 
differently, a modalist view is one that claims that God is Father, Son and Spirit only in some 
derivative sense. In particular, views according to which the Persons are not eternal, 
necessary, or internal to God are modalist. A standard modalist view is that the Persons are 
simply different roles God can play in relation to us, but any account that takes the Persons 
to be in any way derivative should be counted as modalist.21 Modalism denigrates the 
Persons of the Trinity: it maintains that at the deepest metaphysical and theological level, 
God is not triune.  
The view I present is not a version of modalism. This is because God’s being the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit is fundamental, not derivative. God’s being Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit is modelled by a single entity occupying multiple locations in person-space. The model 
expresses a fundamental fact about the personhood-structure of God. God’s occupancy of 
distinct regions of person-space is a fact at the most primitive metaphysical and theological 
level. God is fundamentally, not derivatively, three persons.  
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This is so even on the anti-substantivalist account of person-space that I advocate 
(see also note 19). My deflationary approach to person-space states that it is nothing over 
and above the entities that are persons and their properties and relations. As I described it 
above, it is a systematisation of the facts about possible personhood. Because I an anti-
substantivalist about person-space, this space is not fundamental. But the facts that it 
systematises are. The fact that God is the person of the Father is fundamental whatever 
view we have of the ontological status of person-space. Whether or not an entity is a 
particular person is a different question to whether or not person-space is anything more 
that entities and their properties and relations. The facts about God’s personhood are 
fundamental regardless of the fundamentality of person-space as an independent item of 
our ontology. 
Worries about the fundamentality of God’s three-fold personhood can also be 
assuaged when we notice that the Father is (at least) as much a person as I am. The 
relationship between the entity God and the person of the Father is the same as the 
relationship between the entity that is the person I am and the person that I am. The 
occupancy of the relevant point in person-space is not different in any important way 
between the case of the Father (or the Son, or the Holy Spirit) and the case of other 
persons. God the Father is a full person, and fully. The view I am advocating takes nothing 
away from the Father’s personhood. To make this clear, compare it with the extended 
simple case: the simple entity really is located at certain points of space. Its location at the 
points it occupies is not derivative, nor is it less complete than the location of any other 
object at the point or points it occupies. The extended simple is not in space in a less 
profound sense than anything else is. Likewise, God the Father is not a person in a less 
profound sense than a non-divine person is.  
20 
 
 
Unpalatable theological consequences 
Even if the threat of modalism is countered, there are other theological issues that can be 
raised. An important one is that there still seem to be worrying statements that come out 
true on my account and appear to conflict with the doctrine. My solution holds that the 
Father, Son and Spirit are, strictly speaking, numerically identical (understanding these 
terms as referring to the entity that occupies the relevant portions of person-space). But 
doesn’t the doctrine require that the Persons are simply numerically distinct? My response 
is that the Persons are distinct, when ‘the Persons’ has a certain reference (to points of 
person-space). But the Persons are also not distinct, when this refers to the divine entity. It 
isn’t clear to me that the doctrine and tradition require that the entity that is each Person 
be numerically distinct. If it did, wouldn’t that simply equate to tritheism?  
I take the project of philosophical reflection on the Trinity to be to find ways to 
uphold the core of the doctrine without leading to contradiction. This might require some 
accommodation or interpretation of the doctrinal claims. I do not wish to dwell on the 
question of whether the Latin-style version of Trinitarianism is theologically acceptable: 
there is enough to read on this question already. But, to put it simply, I don’t accept that 
having numerically distinct entities corresponding to the Persons is a theological 
requirement that can be drawn from the core claims outlined in Sect. i. God being Father, 
Son and Spirit doesn’t entail that there are three divine entities. Those who disagree are 
unfortunately not going to accept the model I here offer of the Trinity, but it is their task to 
show how the core claims lead to numerically distinct entities referred to by the Persons. 
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 However, there may be further statements that my position is committed to that 
might be worrying: 
(i) ‘The Father is numerically identical to the Son’ is a literal truth when ‘The 
Father’ and ‘The Son’ have the very same referents they have in the truths 
‘The Father is God’ and ‘The Son is God’. 
(ii) ‘The Spirit is three persons’ is a literal truth when ‘The Spirit’ has the very 
same reference it has in the truth ‘The Spirit is God.’ 
I am committed to these statements, and I do think they prima facie sound bad. But 
reflection makes this prima facie impression much weaker. The Latin Trinitarian view as I 
construe it is required to assent to such claims. But given the ambiguity involved in the 
Person-terms and the fact that the terms are being deliberately disambiguated in unfamiliar 
ways in the contexts of (i) and (ii), I don’t believe it is unacceptable for these statements to 
be true. If we substitute ‘the entity which occupies the point of person-space x’ for the 
relevant terms, the resulting claims seem more palatable, even though they are equivalent. 
This indicates that the unusual use of the terms in the context might be generating a 
reasonable amount of the discomfort. 
 In sum, then, I do recognise that some unfamiliar claims will come out true on the 
interpretation I am proposing of the doctrine of the Trinity. But these unfamiliar claims are 
not unacceptable, and do not therefore rule out the interpretation.22 
 
Indiscernibility and Identity 
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If we accept the identities asserted in (7) – (9), then the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
are numerically identical, where these terms refer to the entity located at the relevant 
portions of person-space. But this seems to suggest that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
must be indiscernible, for a well-established law governing identity is the indiscernibility of 
identicals: when a = b then a and b share all and only the same properties (and relations). 
This is a problem for the doctrine of the Trinity because the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
supposed to share only almost all the same properties. In particular, they are supposed to 
vary in at least the relations of origin.23 The Son is begotten by the Father. The Holy Spirit 
proceeds from the Father (Eastern tradition) or the Father and the Son (Western tradition). 
Thus, it seems that the Father has a property of begetting the Son, which neither the Son 
nor the Holy Spirit do. This appears a violation of the indiscernibility of identicals, and hence 
to prove that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit cannot be numerically identical entities after 
all. To sum up the problem: the identity of the occupants of the distinct points of person-
space seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities across this space. But, in 
fact, the doctrine requires that there is such variation. 
Luckily, the analogy with the extended simple case provides help here once more. 
When they were introduced above, I said nothing about the properties of extended simples. 
We might naturally think that extended simples have to be qualitatively identical at any 
location at which they exist, i.e. they must be the same across the space they occupy. 
Interestingly, this is not a constraint that has been readily adopted in the literature. In fact, 
it is a common view that extended simples can be heterogeneous: that they can have 
different properties at the different locations at which they exist.24 This causes a problem 
for the defenders of heterogeneous extended simples that is parallel to the problem just 
outlined for the Latin Trinitarian: the numerical identity of the occupants of the distinct 
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points of physical space seems to imply that there can be no variation in qualities across this 
space. 
This problem has been noted and discussed in the case of extended simples. A 
number of different solutions to the problem are available. I believe these solutions can be 
used to give analogous solutions to the problem in the case of the Trinity. To argue this, I’ll 
first focus on one solution, which I prefer for both problems. But I’ll then briefly indicate 
how we might translate the alternatives from the extended simples literature to the context 
of the Trinity.  
My favoured approach in both cases is to appeal to certain sorts of properties: 
fundamental distributional properties. A distributional property is a property that grants to 
its bearer a qualitative variation across a particular dimension.25 Typical examples given 
involve colour: being speckled and being polka-dotted, for instance, are colour properties 
that grant variation in colour across space upon their bearers. A speckled hen exhibits 
colour variation across her body by being speckled. A non-colour example might be 
turbulence: by being turbulent, a fluid varies in its flow across space. There are many further 
examples of such properties, and their existence is not controversial. What is contentious, 
however, is the further claim that some distributional properties are fundamental. That is, 
the claim that some distributional properties are such that they cannot be decomposed into 
any collection of other non-distributional properties. If this is so, then there are some 
properties that simply confer on their bearers some qualitative variation in a quality across a 
dimension, and any group of non-distributional properties cannot capture this variation.  
Why should we believe that there are fundamentally distributional properties? I 
can’t conclusively prove their existence here. But some thoughts are suggestive. The best 
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reason to accept fundamental distributional properties seems to be the difficulty in finding 
appropriate non-distributional properties to capture the distributional ones. For instance, 
consider the speckled hen. If being speckled is not fundamental, there are some non-
distributional properties that jointly capture the speckledness of the hen. One might think 
that these non-distributional properties will be the uniform colours of the hen’s body: the 
patches of brown and white. But these patches themselves seem, on closer inspection, to be 
relevantly similar to distributional properties: they are uniform colours spread over a region 
of space. Why is a property that grants uniform colour over a region of space less 
problematic than one that grants a non-uniform colour over a region of space? The former 
seems a special case of the latter: each provides a distribution of a quality over a dimension, 
but in the former case this distribution is less interesting. What we really need for our 
reduction is properties that assign properties to things at points, not regions, of space. But 
then it becomes more difficult to see how things at points of space could be, for instance, 
coloured, or have flow. Fundamentally distributional properties therefore become more 
plausible as the only satisfying account of spread of a quality across a region.26 
Accepting that there are irreducibly distributional properties gives us a solution to 
the problem of the indiscernibility of identicals for heterogeneous extended simples.27 To 
summarise, the solution is that extended simples can have irreducibly distributional 
properties that imply qualitative variation across space in certain ways. The extended simple 
is different in different places by having a single property of a special kind, and this single 
property cannot be decomposed into non-distributional ones. The extended simple has this 
single property at all locations at which it exists, so satisfies the indiscernibility of identicals, 
but the property implies variation so the extended simple is heterogeneous. Thus, the 
extended simple can exhibit variation across space without violating the indiscernibility of 
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identicals.28 To give an example: suppose an extended simple is brown in one region it 
occupies and white in another. It might seem this qualitative variation implies that the thing 
in the first region is distinct from the thing in the second, due to the indiscernibility of 
identicals. But if the extended simple is in fact simply speckled (and irreducibly so), the thing 
in the first region and the second region in fact have one and the same property. Therefore, 
they needn’t be distinct. 
We can translate this, via the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity, 
into a solution for the heterogeneity of God across person-space. I’ll focus on the relations 
of origin. The Father is begetter and the Son is begotten. In our terms, the occupant of the 
point of person-space corresponding to the Father is begetter, and the occupant of the 
point of person-space corresponding to the Son is begotten. This might seem to imply that 
these occupants are distinct entities, through the indiscernibility of identicals. But if God in 
fact simply has an irreducible distributional generation property, the occupants of the points 
of person-space in fact have one and the same property. So they needn’t be distinct after 
all. Thus, I claim that there is a single distributional property of generation that the single 
entity that is God has. This property gives God qualitative variation. The dimension of 
variation is person-space (just as the dimension of variation for an extended simple is 
space). To repeat: God varies across person-space in the property of origination that God 
displays. But this is not a matter of God being different at different parts of person-space: 
there is no property that the entity that the Father is has that the entities that the Son or 
Holy Spirit are do not. For these are all the same entity. Rather, this entity, which is the 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, has a fundamentally distributive property that cannot be 
reduced to non-distributional ones. The seeming qualitative variation of the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit is derived from their joint possession (as a numerically identical entity) of a 
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distributive property. The apparent qualitative variation corresponds to the qualitative 
variation encoded by the distributive property across person-space. More generally, when 
the Persons seem to differ the seeming difference is a result of qualitative variation across 
person-space in virtue of some irreducibly distributional property. This means that the 
indiscernibility of identicals is not violated. 
A concern can be raised here about the analogy.29 The relations of origin seem to 
encode some sort of priority claim: the Father begets the Son and the Spirit proceeds from 
them jointly (in the Western tradition). It might seem that a distributional property cannot 
capture this priority, for such a priority seems to require that the relata of the relation are 
distinct. There are options here. One is to take the relations of origin to be relations 
between the points of person-space, rather than belonging to the entity itself. As these 
points are distinct, the relata would be distinct. A second option is to say that although God 
necessarily and eternally occupies the three points of person-space, God’s occupation of s is 
nevertheless in some sense dependent upon God’s occupation of f and God’s occupation of 
h is in some sense dependent upon God’s occupation of f and s. This dependence between 
the occupations of the points of person-space is what the relations of origin are encoding. 
As all distributional properties grant a certain sort of variation across a space on their 
bearer, the sort of variation in this case is simply that of dependence of occupation. The 
distributional property in question makes it the case that one and the same thing occupies 
the different points of person-space with different levels of priority. On this second 
approach, therefore, the relations of origin therefore do not require distinct relata. 
 So, we have discussed how the distributional properties approach can solve the 
indiscernibility of identicals issue for both the heterogeneous extended simples and the 
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Trinity. As mentioned, there are alternative explanations are available that ground the claim 
that extended simples can be heterogeneous. Three that are especially worth mentioning 
are the following: (a) relativizing properties to regions of space, (b) taking extended simples 
and their stuff to be distinct and (c) using localised trope theory. I believe that each of these 
can be translated into appropriate solutions in the analogue case of the Trinity, but I cannot 
fully explore this here. Let me, though, at least indicate how I think this would work for 
these three alternatives in turn. 
Recall that the problem is how to make sense of extended simples exhibiting 
variation in their qualities over the space they occupy. The relativisation approach is roughly 
the following: the heterogeneous extended simple bears one property with respect to one 
region of space and another property with respect to another. For instance, an extended 
simple O is hot with respect to one region of space and cold with respect to another. The 
relativiser can maintain this by taking properties themselves to be relations to regions of 
space, or by taking the instantiation of properties to be relative to regions of space. This, in 
turn, can be motivated by reference to similar temporal relativisation in some endurantist 
solutions to the problem of change.30 How does this translate to the parallel worry about 
variation of the qualities of God across person-space? Well, the Latin Trinitarian can take the 
properties of origin to include relativisation to parts of person-space. God is thus ‘begetter-
relative-to-f’, ‘begotten-relative-to-s’ and ‘proceeding-relative-to-h’. This would be the 
starting point for an explanation of apparent differences in properties between the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit. It is worth noting, though, that such relativizing might be dependent on 
a substantivalist understanding of person-space, rather than the deflationary view I adopted 
above.31  
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The second approach, advocated by Markosian, involves making a distinction 
between things and stuff and, in particular, between an object and the stuff of which it is 
made.32 An extended simple, on this view, is a simple object but is constituted by certain 
matter. This matter is not simple, but rather has parts. The bearer of the properties which 
vary across space, for Markosian, are the portions of stuff, rather than the extended simple. 
Because these portions are distinct from one another, the indiscernibility of identicals worry 
can’t get off the ground. The central move, then, in Markosian’s solution is to identify the 
bearers of the properties as stuff, not things.  
Translating this into the Trinitarian case is more complicated than in the other 
solutions, and I am more tentative about its success. But the central move, again, is to 
identify the bearers of the properties of origin as distinct from the entity that is God. One 
candidate is the points of person-space themselves, a possibility mentioned above.33 
Because the points of person-space are distinct, if they are the bearers of the varying 
properties then no problem from the indiscernibility of identicals arises. Again, as in the 
previous solution, an approach along these lines might be more conducive to a Latin 
Trinitarian who took a more ontologically robust view of the points of person-space that I 
have done in this paper.34 This is because Markosian explicitly relies on an ontology that 
doesn’t reduce things to stuff or vice versa (called the ‘Mixed Ontology’). The parallel here 
would be the irreducibility of points of person-space to entities (and vice versa).  
However, there’s still more work to do before a Markosian-style solution to the 
Trinitarian case is established. In the extended simple case, there is a relation of constitution 
between the stuff and the things. What is the parallel relation for the Trinity? Not 
constitution, as the divine is not constituted by points of person-space. Perhaps it is simply 
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the occupation relation. But it’s not at all obvious how the occupation relation would do the 
required job. So more work would need to be done to develop such a Markosian-style 
account. I will therefore only tentatively propose that a solution along these lines is worth 
investigating further. 
The third alternative is to take the properties that are ascribed to the extended 
simple as tropes of a specific sort. Tropes are particulars, rather than universals, and give 
certain qualities to their bearers. The claim of this solution is that an extended simple has 
localised tropes: O has both the ‘hot at s’ trope and the ‘cold at s*’ trope.35 These tropes do 
not resemble, but they are not contradictory either. So the extended simple displays the 
variation by having non-resembling localised tropes that are local to the different parts of 
space that it occupies. (One might wonder about a connection to the first, relativizing 
approach here.) Similarly, the Trinitarian can make use of tropes with circumscribed 
locations in person-space. For instance, the relations of origin can be taken to be tropes that 
are local within this space: God has both the local-to-point-of-person-space-f begetter trope 
and the non-resembling local-to-point-of-person-space-s begotten trope. As tropes which 
are local to those points of person-space, these can be jointly held by a single thing, so the 
indiscernibility of identicals is not violated. 
I have explicitly not investigated these candidate solutions in detail, either as applied 
to heterogeneous extended simples or to the Trinity. But I hope to have indicated how work 
in the literature in the former case carry over to the latter. Thus, the defence of the Latin 
Trinity against the indiscernibility of identicals worry is heavily indebted to discussion of how 
to accommodate variation in the extended simples literature. Although I prefer the 
distributional properties view, if any such explanation is coherent then there may be a 
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translation into the Trinitarian case.36 I conclude that we have the resources to avoid the 
charge that the numerical identity account proposed fails to capture the relations of origin 
that obtain within the Godhead. 
 
The Metaphysical Status of the Persons 
There is a fourth worry that might follow from the above discussion. The appeal to 
distributional properties might make us concerned about the status of the Persons of the 
Trinity. I’ll show this worry via extended simples. 
Imagine an extended simple rod, R.37 Imagine, further, that R is red in one 
continuous half of the spatial region it occupies and blue in the other continuous half of the 
spatial region it occupies. The concern in the last section was that it seems as though what is 
located at one half of the spatial region and what is located at the other half have different 
properties. But if R is an extended simple then there is just one entity located at these 
regions, which cannot have different properties from itself. To resolve this initial issue, we 
say that R has a single, irreducibly distributional property of being red-and-blue-in-the-
appropriate-ways. Contrast this description of the extended simple case with what is 
happening in a normal case. Normally, we would say that R has a red half and a blue half. 
But we are not allowed to say this in the extended simple case as R is a simple. Speaking 
with metaphysical rigour, therefore, there is no such thing as a half of R. What there is, 
instead, is a region of space at which R is located which is where R is red. 
Now we turn to the Trinity. The Son is begotten. What does this mean, in 
metaphysical rigour? It does not mean that there is an entity that is the Son, and that this 
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entity is begotten simpliciter. For the entity occupying the relevant person-space is God, 
who is not begotten simpliciter. Rather, it means that there is a region of person-space such 
that it is occupied by God and God is begotten there. God has the irreducible distributional 
property of divine origin, and the way God has this heterogeneous property in the region of 
person-space corresponding to the second Person is what it is for the second Person to be 
begotten. But, much as we cannot in metaphysical rigour talk of the red half of R, we cannot 
speak of the Son part of God. In metaphysical rigour, we can talk of the occupant of a point 
of person-space (= God), and also of a point of person-space. We have the entity, God, and 
the three points of person-space God occupies, f, s and h. A single entity is each of the 
Persons of the Trinity. But in talking of the distinctness of the Persons, we are not speaking 
of their numerical distinctness. Rather, we are referring to the points of person-space so 
occupied by God. The lesson from this is that the terms ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Spirit’ (and their 
cognates) refer to God when speaking of an entity, but can also be used to refer to different 
categories of thing, namely points of person-space. God belongs to the category of entities. 
Points in person-space, by contrast, are not entities. This may be unpalatable to some: they 
may be disconcerted that we can, using the term ‘Father’, refer not to an entity but to a way 
of being a person. This, I take it, is a cost of the theory. 
 
Necessary Co-extension of Persons and Entities 
A fifth worry is connected to this, and denies that there is such a distinction between 
persons and entities. A disputant might argue as follows: 
It is clear that persons and entity are numerically identical. When I talk about 
Hillary Clinton, I am talking about the entity that is Hillary Clinton and the 
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person Hillary Clinton: they are one and the same thing. One way to 
characterise this is to assert that persons are a sub-category of entities (as are, 
e.g., animals, artefacts, sub-atomic particles and planets). But I don’t even 
need this assertion; I merely need it to be the case that persons and entities 
cannot be separated. So the notion of person-space is otiose: it is exactly 
isomorphic to a sub-region of the space generated by assigning each entity a 
point. 
The disputant is right that I need this distinction between persons and entities, for I claim 
that in the Trinity there is only one entity, but three persons. Hence I take it that counting 
by entities and counting by persons are different, and, more importantly, that what it is to 
be a particular entity is not the same as what it is to be a particular person.38 But I don’t 
think that the disputant’s position is as obvious as it is presented. Though I have made my 
task deliberately difficult by using a notion of personhood that is generic, it worth 
remembering that the doctrinal texts do not force us to hold that the ‘Persons’ need satisfy 
philosophical analyses of the contemporary notion of personhood. Thus even if ‘persons’ in 
the contemporary usage implies identity of entity, it may not in the theological usage.  
But more ambitiously, I think the putative possible cases like that of Jekyll and Hyde 
might make us doubt the identity claim even in the case of human persons. Given that what 
I am seeking to do is make a conceptual distinction between person-structure and entity-
structure, to rule this out the disputant needs to not only show that persons and entities are 
related one-to-one in actuality, but that they must be. In other words, not only that person-
space and a region of entity-space are isomorphic when considering actual persons and 
entities, but also when considering all possible persons and entities. The onus, I feel, is on 
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the disputant to establish this. Presumably establishing this would be done by giving an 
account of personhood (and, indeed, of entities), the satisfactory completion of which 
would be no mean feat. 
 
Lack of Novelty 
Finally, even a sympathetic reader may worry that what I am presenting here is no real 
advance in our understanding, as it adds nothing to the Latin Trinitarian approach spelt out 
in detail by Brian Leftow in various places. In response, I’d like to point to a few things I think 
this analogy does add, but first it is worth a brief sketch of Leftow’s view in order to make 
the relevant contrasts clear. 
Leftow presents an account of the Trinity that belongs in the same category as that 
defended in this paper: a Latin approach. That is, his view is one that maintains the strict 
identity of the Persons with God and therefore has the task of explaining what the 
distinctions between the Persons consists in. For Leftow, God is just one thing but has three 
distinguishable ‘life streams’: these are what correspond to the Persons. So there is a life of 
the Father, a life of the Son and a life of the Spirit: these are distinct lives and contain 
distinct conscious events but all belong to a single entity. A parallel Leftow draws is with an 
imagined case of time-travel: the time-traveller might be simultaneously living different 
parts of the life of a single thing. Similarly, the Father, Son and Spirit are all numerically 
identical to God, but God’s life has the curious form that it is composed of three 
simultaneous strands. Unlike in the time-travel case, God’s life strands are not sequential.  
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Thus, Leftow’s account has significant connections to the one I present here. 
However, as mentioned, I believe there to be some key differences. In order of increasing 
importance, they are: 
 
a) At the very least, the analogy with extended simples offers a different way to 
approach the Latin Trinitarian theory. The analogy with extended simples is a 
helpful one, in that it clarifies the distinction between the entity that is 
located at points of person-space and the points of person-space themselves. 
The parallel with the separation of the mereological and spacetime location 
structure of extended simples helps to warrant such a distinction. 
 
b) Leftow’s account of the Trinity takes the Persons’ identities to be event-based: 
it is the events of their lives that individuate and distinguish the Persons.39 My 
approach is more flexible: it is neutral on what the Persons of the Trinity are 
and how they are to be characterised. These will depend on the precise 
character of personhood (and hence of person-space). By occupying a point of 
person-space, entities are particular persons. Thus, entities are the things that 
are people, but counting by entities and counting by persons can give 
different results. But this leaves open both the metaphysical category to 
which persons belong and the means of characterising persons. It therefore 
doesn’t require that the Persons of the Trinity are understood as event-based 
(though they can be understood in this way). My account is thus more general 
than Leftow’s, and allows the Trinitarian more resources for answering the 
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difficult question of what the Persons are. Leftow’s original account may be 
easily adaptable to accommodate wider possibilities, but here it is explicit that 
a Latin Trinitarian approach doesn’t entail an event-based view of the identity 
of the Persons. 
 
c) Thirdly, the approach doesn’t require the metaphysical (or conceptual) 
possibility of time-travel. (Perhaps Leftow’s doesn’t either.40) So if you’re 
uncomfortable with time-travel, you might still accept the analogy offered 
here. On the other hand, of course, extended simples are controversial, so 
perhaps some are more inclined to accept the possibility of time-travel than of 
extended simples. At any rate, a second, logically independent analogy 
bolsters the case. Furthermore, the central work done by Leftow’s time-travel 
analogy is to give us a case of multilocation: multilocation provides the 
conceptual grip on the Latin Trinity he advocates. While extended simple 
cases can be thought of as instances of multilocation (where the object is fully 
located at each of the points of space it can be found), they do not have to be. 
For instance, extended simples could be only partially located at each of the 
points of space where they can be found, and fully located only at the 
combination of these.41 Similarly, although the above has been tacitly framed 
in terms of multilocation, God could be located at the relevant three points of 
person-space only partially, and fully located only at their sum. I myself do not 
favour this view, but it shows the independence of the Latin Trinitarian 
approach from the possibility of multilocation. What matters, rather, is the 
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different structures of entities and person-space. The account here presented 
therefore does not, unlike Leftow’s, rely on multilocation.  
 
d) Finally, the extended simples literature gives us a series of neat options for 
solving the problem of the indiscernibility of identicals and the different 
relations of origin within the Godhead for a view that asserts the numerical 
identity of God with Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These options correspond to 
the solutions to the parallel problem of heterogeneous extended simples. I’ve 
outlined the position I find most appealing, namely irreducible distributive 
properties, but it is a major benefit to the Latin approach that there are these 
further metaphysical resources already developed that can be explored.   
 
(v) Conclusion 
I have here presented an analogy between extended simples and the Trinity, more 
specifically between the way that extended simples occupy space and the way that God is 
distinct persons. The analogy relies on a notion of ‘person-space’. I believe this analogy 
strengthens the Latin Trinitarian approach by showing the distinction between entity- and 
person-structure, and hence the possibility of these coming apart in the divine. The analogy 
helps to show how a Latin Trinity can maintain both the numerical identity of God with the 
Persons (understood as occupants of person-space) and the numerical distinctness of the 
Persons (understood as locations in person-space). It might also give pause to those who are 
willing to take extended simples metaphysically seriously but are not willing to do the same 
in the case of the Trinity. 42 
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NOTES 
1 I will speak of space rather than spacetime in what follows, though everything I will say is translatable into 
spacetime terminology. I do so simply to avoid complications (especially regarding the relationship between 
the temporal axis of spacetime (in a given reference frame) and time itself). 
2 This characterisation might be resisted if we can make sense of a region of space that does not contain parts. 
If so, an entity could be extended in virtue of occupying a region without thereby having a mereologically 
complex location. But it is natural to characterise regions in mereological terms, whereby a region is 
mereologically complex and contains points of space as parts. So an alternative, non-mereological account of 
what it is to be a region would need to be provided before we can develop this thought further. Thanks to 
Mark Murphy for noticing this. 
3 Some objects may inherit their structure from their location, and vice versa. Such objects necessarily have the 
same structure as their locations. The claim here is that not all objects and their locations are like this. (See 
Saucedo, “Parthood and Location” for a discussion of various ways that objects and their locations can fail to 
align). 
4 This is the Book of Common Prayer’s translation. Note that Eastern Church Christians don’t typically accept 
the Athanasian Creed, but the core problem I identify is shared nevertheless. 
                                                          
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 Michael Rea, in his chapter “The Trinity,” 403-404 states that this is called the ‘the logical problem of the 
Trinity’ by philosophers and ‘the threeness-oneness problem’ by theologians. As a couple of examples, the 
problem is set out this way by Kleinschmidt, “Many-One Identity and the Trinity”, and by Howard-Snyder, in 
his introductory entry “Trinity”. 
6 By this, I do not mean to suggest that it is the most important or difficult problem associated with the Trinity, 
but rather that it is in some sense the most primitive: if we can’t fix this problem there’s just a contradiction 
being expressed. 
7 For discussion, see Rea, “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity”. A sortal is a kind term for some 
countable kind. ‘Chicken’, ‘statue’ and ‘molecule’ are examples of sortals. 
8 See Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism: Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations” for a discussion of this. 
9 There is much written both in favour of and against the Greek or ‘social’ account of the Trinity. The McCall 
and Rea collection, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, especially Part 1, is a good place to 
begin, and William Hasker’s recent book length treatment in his Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God is a 
prominent defence. 
10  Leftow, “A Latin Trinity”. 
11 I will discuss in more detail below how the ‘person-structure’ and ‘substance-structure’ of the divine come 
apart. It’s worth flagging here, though, that although extended simples are easily understood on a 
substantivalist view of space, where space is something over and above its occupants, substantivalism is not 
necessary for extended simples. For an anti-substantivalist view of space might still hold that space can be 
constructed on the basis of the best systematisation of distance relations between entities, and on this basis 
some simple entity might be multiply located in space. Such an entity would have distance relations to other 
objects that are inconsistent with its occupying a single point of space. So space being relational doesn’t entail 
that the location and mereological structure of entities must align. Thanks to David Glick for discussion on this, 
which was an issue raised by a reviewer. 
12 Wittgenstein’s discussion in the Tractatus, 1.13 of logical space is an important precursor to philosophical 
use of spatial concepts, and my thanks to Brian Leftow for noting this. 
13 Perhaps it is too asking too much to grant that a football team can be considered as a single thing. I suspect 
if one will not grant this, other examples I would appeal to (such as families, committees, or bands) will be no 
more persuasive. Though it will be helpful for my later discussion if we already have cases where things are 
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extended in person-space, if these cases are not accepted it doesn’t rule out the divine as a sui generis entity 
with extension in such a space. 
14 This might follow straightforwardly given certain principles governing how and when wholes inherit 
properties of their parts. But I won’t explore this here, as the example is simply indicative. 
15 Another way to frame this issue, suggested by a reviewer, is whether the modal facts from which the points 
of person-space are abstracted include ‘thisness’ facts. For what it’s worth, I am inclined to view person-space 
as purely qualitative, and hence permit multiple occupation of points of it by entities exactly similar in ways 
relevant to personhood.  
16 For discussion of the ontological priority of configuration space and connected issues, see Ney, 
“Fundamental Physical Ontologies and the Constraint of Empirical Coherence: a Defense of Wave Function 
Realism” and for discussion of the ontological status of possible worlds the classic text is Lewis, On the Plurality 
of Worlds.  
17 If the reader is uncomfortable with modal facts, or indeed facts in general, we can be deflationary here: 
simply insert for ‘modal facts’ whatever it is that does this role in your metaphysics. 
18 The editor, Mark Murphy, has raised the following problem: if person-space is not substantive, isn’t my 
argument that follows simply a reformulation of pre-existing claims in the doctrine? In other words, if I don’t 
make any distinctive claims about what it is to be a person (i.e. occupy a point of person-space) or posit 
person-space to be an additional ontological ingredient, what more am I saying than that God is Father, Son 
and Spirit? 
I think this is a good challenge. I have two replies. Firstly, I’m certainly not trying to say something 
that is different to the doctrine, and perhaps not much beyond the doctrine. So I’m reasonably happy if the 
position is a reformulation of that doctrine, albeit hopefully more precise in certain ways. Secondly, the 
reformulation of the doctrine in these terms allows us to see the conceptual space between being a certain 
person and being a certain entity that, I think, the doctrine tacitly relies upon. That is, my discussion can show 
the coherence of the pre-existing claims, a coherence that becomes apparent by the reformulation. The 
reformulation permits distinctions between different structures that were previously obscured. These 
distinctions show how the Trinitarian position is not contradictory in the way outlined in Sect. i. 
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Further, the analogy with extended simples suggests that philosophers in other areas are willing to 
countenance very similar moves. So the use of person-space may still be dialectically helpful even if, on my 
deflationary understanding, it doesn’t add content to the Trinitarian claims. 
19 I wish to flag something here that will be important for later discussion. I take person-space to be a 
mechanism for formalising claims about personhood, without adding anything ontologically or metaphysically 
serious. But being deflationary about person-space and its points is not being deflationary about the 
personhood facts. Although person-space is not fundamental in the sense that it describes pre-existing claims, 
this does not mean that those claims themselves are not fundamental. By reducing person-space to facts 
about possible persons, I do not mean to reduce the facts about possible persons to anything else. This is 
important for my response to the threat of modalism, and will be mentioned again later in the paper. 
20 This is not to say that any particular thing can occupy any particular point of person-space: it would seem 
extremely natural to assert that there are constraints on the range of points that particular things might 
occupy. But person-space gives us the range of possible ways that any thing can be a person. 
21 This typical view is probably akin to the views of Sabellius, who was the figure against whom responses to 
modalism were first formulated. 
22 My thanks to one of the reviewers for raising the issue tackled in this section, which also required revising 
the scope of the paper, and to Brian Leftow for discussion. 
23 There are also be other properties that seem true of one of the Persons and not another. For instance, it 
could be argued that (while incarnate) the Son doesn’t know everything that the Father does. I can’t enter into 
this debate here. But what I say about the relations of origin will generalise, if necessary: I therefore focus on 
this particular example from here on. 
24 Those who allow for heterogeneous extended simples include Parsons, “Distributional Properties”, 
Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People”, and McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative 
Heterogeneity”. Certain existence monists, who believe that there is only one thing and that it is simple, would 
presumably also subscribe to variation across that thing (as does Schaffer in, “From Nihilism to Monism”). Of 
course, heterogeneous extended simples are not without their detractors, e.g. Spencer, “A Tale of Two 
Simples”. 
A prima facie reason to think such variation over space can be argued for is the analogy to the 
problem of temporary intrinsics, where a parallel indiscernibility of identicals challenge is raised for objects 
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enduring (i.e. being numerically identical) despite variation over time. But I cannot make this argument here 
and will simply assume the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. 
25 Parsons, “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?” and his “Distributional Properties” 
introduce these properties. 
26 As an aside, we can find some further support for the possibility of fundamentally distributional properties 
from a couple of sources. Firstly, if spacetime is gunky (i.e. if spacetime is infinitely divisible and has no points), 
all properties of objects located in this spacetime will be fundamentally distributional. Secondly, if any 
properties are emergent in a certain way (i.e. don’t supervene on the properties of point-sized objects), these 
properties will also be fundamentally distributional. 
27 See, again, Parsons “Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?”. 
28 There are, of course, criticisms of the distributional properties solution to the problem involving 
heterogeneous extended simples. McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity” is a prominent 
critic. A central worry is that the distributional properties are underinformative. The speckled hen, for 
example, remains speckled regardless of where the speckles are on her body. But, McDaniel argues, the 
different ways for her to be speckled cannot be captured if being speckled is a fundamentally distributional 
property. This issue, while important, is not relevant for us. This is because the points of physical space that an 
extended simple occupies are qualitatively identical, and so distributional properties cannot distinguish 
between points of this space. Points of person-space, by contrast, are not qualitatively identical and hence a 
fundamental distributional property across this space can be orientated (see the next paragraph). Thanks to a 
reviewer for encouraging me to think about this. 
29 My thanks to Mark Murphy for raising this concern, and offering the first of the solutions I mention. 
30 See, for instance, Mellor, Real Time, 111-114 and Haslanger, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. The idea 
is that properties (or the having of properties) are relative to a time, thus avoiding the charge that when an 
object changes one and the same thing has incompatible properties. 
31 Thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out. The issue is that substantivalism about time and space makes 
much more plausible the relativisation to them posited by certain endurantist and extended simple solutions 
respectively (argument to this effect in the endurance case can be found in Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, 
113ff. I don’t find this totally convincing, but here is not the place to say why (though see also note 11). My 
own views on endurance and change, at least, do not require this (see Pickup, “A Situationalist Solution to the 
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Ship of Theseus Puzzle” for some indicative material). At any rate, the pairing of a substantivalist view of 
person-space with relativisation to that space is not something I am ruling out. As I have said, though, I prefer 
the pairing of anti-substantivalism about person-space and fundamental distributional properties (which do 
not require relativisation). 
32 See Markosian, “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People”, which spells out further some thoughts from his 
“Simples”. 
33 Another option is to take God to be in some sense composed of divine ‘matter’, distinct from the divine 
thing. This matter would be complex, with exactly three parts (corresponding to the Persons). This is 
suggestive but not something I’ll investigate here. 
34 See Sect. ii above. 
35 This is how McDaniel, “Extended Simples and Qualitative Heterogeneity” develops the solution. It draws on 
a similar solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics outlined by Ehring, “Lewis, Temporary Intrinsics, and 
Momentary Tropes”. 
36 As noted above, it would take further work to establish this for Markosian’s solution. 
37 I am grateful to Dani Kodaj for this example, and the point it makes. 
38 If counting by persons and counting by entities gives different results, this might seem to suggest my 
solution is a variant of a relative identity view. But this isn’t actually so. If I see three of the same brand of car, 
counting by cars and counting by brands of car will give different results. This doesn’t require relative identity, 
but just that cars and brands of car are not in a one-to-one correspondence. Thanks to Mark Murphy for 
highlighting this possible concern.  
39 Leftow, “A Latin Trinity”: 315 
40 See ibid. p309-311 for discussion. 
41 For this ‘spanner’ approach see, e.g., McDaniel, “Extended Simples”. 
42 This paper has greatly benefitted from the input of a number of people, including Mark Murphy, two 
referees for this journal, Brian Leftow, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra and my colleagues on The Metaphysics of 
Entanglement project based in the Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University. I am grateful to them all, and to 
the funder of our project, the Templeton World Charity Foundation. 
 
